Saturday, March 27, 2010
European Parliament Discusses Current Situation of Tibet
Brussels: During the Mini-Plenary session of the European Parliament in Brussels on Thursday, the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) held a debate on the current situation of Tibet reviewing the peaceful protests by Tibetans inside Tibet in 2008.
During the debate EU Commissioner and Vice-President of the European Commission, Mr. Maros Sefcovic said: "We have real concerns about the human rights situation in Tibet, about the fact that Tibet has remained largely closed to international media, diplomats and humanitarian organisations and also about the lack of progress in talks between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities."
"The EU position does not leave any room for misinterpretation. Therefore, let me stress: the EU respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, including Tibet. We respect the ‘one China’ policy."
*However, we have always supported peaceful reconciliation through dialogue between the Chinese authorities and the representatives of the Dalai Lama. This dialogue has to be constructive and substantive, addressing all core issues such as the preservation of Tibet’s unique culture, religion and traditions and the need to achieve a system of meaningful autonomy for Tibet within the Chinese Constitution."
"The dialogue should also address the participation of all Tibetans in decision-making. For the EU, Tibet is a human rights issue. We have consistently passed this message on to our Chinese counterparts and listened carefully to their views, and we make every effort to understand their position in a spirit of mutual respect."
"But human rights are universal, and the situation in Tibet is a legitimate concern for the international community, a point that we regularly make to our Chinese interlocutors."
"In the Sino-Tibetan dialogue, the Tibetan side has recently submitted an updated memorandum on genuine autonomy for the future of Tibet. We welcome that the Tibetan side has reiterated its firm commitment not to seek separation or independence."
"We are also pleased that the Dalai Lama remains committed to the middle-way approach and to dialogue as the only means for achieving a mutually acceptable and lasting solution."
"The EU welcomes the fact that both parties continue to hold talks even if we note with regret the lack of results and the lack of momentum."
"Let me conclude by appealing to the representatives of the two sides to continue and intensify the dialogue with an open spirit and with a view to achieving a durable solution in Tibet. From our side I can guarantee the EU's wholehearted support to such a process."
MEPs Call For Appointment of EU Special Envoy For Tibet
While expressing concern over the current situation in Tibet the MEPs called for the appointment of an EU Special Envoy for Tibet, a meeting between High Representative Baroness Ashton and His Holiness the Dalai Lama and to send an investigation team to Tibet.
source tibet.net
Tibetan Buddhist Monk Gets Seven Years In Prison After Secret Trial
Source: AllVoices.com
Monk Accused Of Leaking Information To Outside WorldSources in China say a 39-year-old Tibetan Buddhist monk has been sentenced to seven years imprisonment after a secret trial.
Tibetcustom.com reports that the monk, Ngagchung, has been held incommunicado since his arrest in July of 2008. The Web site quoted the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy.
The monk was tried by the Kardze Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan Province.
No details were available on the trial. His family members have not been allowed to see him.
He was arrested on suspicion of leaking information about Tibet outside China. He is believed to be held in a prison near Chengdu.
Friday, March 26, 2010
As China prepares for post-Dalai Lama Tibet, what is India to do with the Tibetan Exiles?
Source: IDSA
The post-Dalai Lama era is likely to be fraught with uncertainty and has profound security implications for both India and China. While China is afflicted with the Tibetan unrest, India has worries about the future of Tibetan refugees spread across the subcontinent. Relations between the two Asian giants are also greatly entwined with the Tibet factor. While India is yet to evolve a strategy to deal with the fate of the Tibetan refugees after the present Dalai Lama passes away, China is incrementally preparing to confront the Tibet problem in the post-Dalai Lama phase. Thus, Hu Jintao’s reconfigured Tibet policy based on promotion of Buddhism and creation of a new monkhood is aimed at confronting the security situation in the post-Dalai Lama era. It is also geared towards weakening India’s manoeuverability on the Tibet issue and bilateral border negotiations.
China’s latest move towards incremental preparation for the post-Dalai Lama era came on February 28, 2010, when it nominated its designated Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu, to the Parliamentary advisory body, the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) as one of the 13 new members. Prior to this, on October 18, 2008, the Chinese government formulated plans to set up the first-ever academy of Tibetan Buddhism in southwestern China. Construction for the $11.7 million project began in October 2008. The purpose is to train “patriotic and devotional religious personnel”. In other words, the attempt is to build an officially approved cadre of monks in order to dilute the influence of defiant monks in Tibet, who have faith in the Dalai Lama. In fact, the signs for the creation of a new monkhood subservient to Beijing was witnessed in July 2007 when in a major diplomatic move the government in China passed a law on reincarnation -- Order No. 5 of China’s State Administration of Religious Affairs, Management Measures for the Reincarnation of ‘Living Buddhas’ in Tibetan Buddhism -- which required all reincarnate lamas to be approved by the state. Through this major tactical step China asserted its right to manage and select all reincarnate lamas of Tibetan Buddhism and thereby sought to choose its own Dalai Lama after the present one passes away. This is based on the assumption that with the exit of the present Dalai Lama the Tibetan problem would inevitably end.
Earlier from April 13 to 16, 2006, China organised for the first time a World Buddhist Forum in Hangzhou to espouse its leadership of the Buddhist world. It also provided an international platform to China’s own Panchen Lama to bolster his legitimacy both internally and globally. It may be recalled that China hand-picked Gyaincain Norbu as the 11th Panchen Lama in 1995, rejecting Gedhun Choekyi Nyima selected by the Dalai Lama. Since then, China has been steadily raising his profile. The Dalai Lama was not invited for this international forum in which over 1,000 monks and experts from thirty-seven countries gathered to participate in the discussion on building a harmonious world, because he was seen as “splitting the motherland and sabotaging the unity of ethnic groups.” As such, his participation would have caused “disharmony”, as reported by Xinhua.
More importantly, the Fifth National Conference on the Work of Tibet held in Beijing in January 18-20, 2010 indicates China’s policy direction on Tibet. This was convened especially keeping an eye on the future of the Dalai Lama. Evidently, the 2010 Work on Tibet came after the March 2008 Tibetan uprisings. The last Conference was held in 2001. During the 2010 Conference, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a very important statement on the need for lasting stability in Tibet, implying that Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of creating economic prosperity to mitigate separatism alone could not tame the restive Tibetan population. Identifying that “Tibet faces a special contradiction between people of all ethnic group and the separatist forces led by the Dalai clique,” Hu Jintao emphasised on the need for “leap frog development” and “lasting stability” as the major themes of the work of Tibet. The emphasis on “lasting stability” is particularly striking. The Work Report talks about adopting substantial measures to ensure “normal order of Tibetan Buddhism.” This perhaps signals the need to promote and preserve Tibetan Buddhism, which has hitherto been stifled or controlled in Tibet. Also, perhaps there is the realization on the part of the Chinese leadership that the forces of identity and nationalism cannot be eliminated through repressive measures. Conspicuously, this means that along with Deng’s policy of economic development in minority areas, Hu Jintao adds a major policy decision of promoting Tibetan Buddhism, which in some sense would mean upholding the Tibetan identity. Arguably, China is incrementally preparing for the post-Dalai Lama scenario. This momentous decision also has ominous implications for India.
First, it would certainly blunt Western criticism about China’s repressive policy in Tibet. Second, it would discredit the Dalai Lama’s criticism of cultural repression of the Tibetans as well as invalidate his demand for ‘Greater Tibet’ to promote and preserve Tibetan identity. Third, it would weaken India’s Tibetan card or in other words weaken the threat of re-opening the Tibet question as a kind of pressure tactic on China.
In the light of these developments, it is pertinent to ask how India is preparing for the post-Dalai Lama era. The presence of the Dalai Lama in India along with 120,000 Tibetan refugees spread across 39 settlements is leverage for India. But India has so far steadfastly avoided using the Tibetan card. In fact, while China has shown eagerness for the Dalai Lama’s return to China, it has categorically refused to take back the exiled Tibetan population based in India. Of course, the Dalai Lama has refused to go back to Tibet leaving his exiled-people behind. Quite clearly, China is not interested in resolving the Tibet issue. By constantly disparaging the Dalai Lama as a ‘splittist’ and involving his representatives in fruitless talks, China is simply buying time till the Dalai Lama passes away, after which, it hopes, the Tibetan movement would naturally fizzle out. In the meantime, through several measures, China is incrementally consolidating its hold on Tibet. Consequently, China’s Tibet policy is geared towards weakening India’s bargaining position on the border negotiations as the Tibet factor is entwined with the disputed India-China border.
In this scenario, India needs to raise with China the issue of the future of the exiled Tibetan population in India. This is pertinent since the long-term presence of Tibetans in India could prove to be troublesome in terms of internal peace. The 1999 Manali disturbance in Himachal Pradesh bears testimony to the fact that the growing presence of Tibetans and their engagement at times with illegal trade and business has brought them in collision with the local population. With time Tibetans are only likely to strike deeper roots in India, and a future Gorkhaland kind of a scenario could well become a reality.
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Thursday, March 25, 2010
Two Earthquakes Jolt Tibet
Lhasa, March 24 (IANS)
Two earthquakes measuring 5.7 and 5.5 on the Richter scale jolted the Tibetan Autonomous Region in southwest China Wednesday, the Earthquake Networks Centre said.
The first quake, magnitude-5.7, occurred around 10.06 a.m., while the second temblor, magnitude-5.5 occurred about 30 minutes later, both in northern Tibet's Nyainrong county, Xinhua reported.
The epicentre of the first quake was 32.4 degrees north latitude and 93.0 degrees east longitude at a depth of about eight kilometres.
The epicentre of the second quake was 32.5 degrees north latitude and 92.8 degrees east longitude at a depth of about seven kilometres.
The quakes hit a sparsely inhabited mountainous area, said Zhu Quan, director with the seismological bureau of Tibet. There was no report of casualties or damage after the quakes.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Reality behing Beijing Olympic Emblem & Torch Relay
China's Tibet?
Smith needs to be appreciated for writing a book on Tibet-China crisis, but it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to realize that Beijing’s final goal for Tibet is to assimilate and sinicize it completely rather than giving it “autonomy”.
I don’t understand why we still cling to this illusion of securing “genuine autonomy” from the Chinese. Are our hopes based on a careful and objective analysis of China’s political and strategic considerations or are we playing into the hands of China's tactics of "buying time"? Or worse, are there some vested interests involved in pursuing “dialogue and negotiations”? I hope and pray that my doubts and cynicism are nothing but doubts and cynicism.
In dealing with the Chinese, we must ensure that Tibet’s vital interests are secured, no matter whatever heavy price we need to pay for it. Therefore the first step that we need to take is this: openly acknowledge and declare that talks with Beijing have not yielded anything for Tibet. Instead these talks have further tightened the noose on us to strive for our legitimate right to seek freedom and justice.
It's still not too late for Tibet. The most important thing is that we should not give up our struggle; our brothers and sisters in Tibet have not given up. Tibet can be resurrected. The other countries have done it. So why can’t we do it? We can do it. Former Soviet Republics, Balkan States, East Timor have all done it. South Ossetia seems to be doing it at the moment. Tibet could be the next, if only we believe in ourselves and not succumb to pressures from outside…
Always remember empires, even the mightiest of ones like that of Rome, fall and disintegrates. China is no exception!
--Tenzin Nyinjey
(The above write up was written after reading Jamyang Norbu's review of China's Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation, authored by Dr. Warren Smith).
Monday, June 23, 2008
The Spirit call Tibet!
Considering the precarious situation of us exiled Tibetans, the only pragmatic thing we can do for Tibet is talk and debate on it. In the process, we can hope to find a new way for Tibet. Some actions can also be taken, and is being taken by courageous Tibetans - some non-violent protests, every now and then.
Such campaigns have been initiated ever since we were driven out of our homeland – way back in 1949. Its been a long time back now. Fifty years might not be a long time for a national liberation struggle. They say India fought for two hundred years before it became independent. But then we should also remember that it took just thirty odd years to completely change the face of China. The country was one of the poorest in the world when it was established in 1949. But now it is considered as the future superpower, overpowering even the mighty United States.
Sadly, no concrete solution has been found for Tibet. Tibetans on both sides of the Himalayas continue to suffer severe repression and national humiliation. Democracy, human rights, economic development, global warming, rule of law, freedom, dignity – these are luxurious items for us.
We don’t even have a secure base. We are not sure of what will happen tommorrow. Despite such tough conditions, Tibetans have so far kept the issue of Tibet alive. It has remained steadfast to its struggle for national freedom. China keeps on lecturing on “peace and stability” in Tibet. This is a clear indication that so far it has not been able to pacify Tibet.
Although China controls Tibet physically thanks to its overwhelming force represented by the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police, it has not been able to extinguish the flame of freedom that burns in the heart of every Tibetan. Be they communist cadres, monks, nuns, or common Tibetans, all of them know that Tibet is an occupied country. They know that the identity of Tibet can be secured only when the Chinese are driven out of Tibet.
And herein lies the significance. As long as the spirit of the Tibetans last, as long as the will and aspiration to resist Chinese colonialism continues, there is always hope for Tibet.
Tenzin Nyinjey
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
A POEM
Flowing through the river of life
Mingling with the souls of humans
Describing their woeful pains
And voicing their cherished desires
A poem is the expression of flowering dreams
Rising from the earth in a lamentable world
Bringing fresh color to life
Ridding the world of deplorable misery
And silently dispelling the smell of despair
A poem is the flamboyant actor on stage
Showing off its many faces and colors
Giving the audience food for thought
Leaving them with questions answerable
While telling a tale of a thousand adventures
A poem is the messenger of natural forces
Rejuvenating the future of different courses
Resuscitating present circumstances
Redeeming past occurrences
While resurrecting inspirational yearnings
Tsoltim N. Shakabpa
EVER SAY NEVER?
Never say never
When it comes to your country's freedom
When it comes to saving your kingdom
Your freedom is your sacred right
Fight for it with all your might
Your kingdom is yours and only yours
Let not aggressors onto your shores
Beware of occupiers who come by force
With guns they will come and break down your doors
As they did with Tibet
Which today we regret
Still we Tibetans fight for our rights
And have independence in our sights
Still we Tibetans never say never
We have freedom in our minds forever
And we know one day for sure
We will regain freedom pure
Tsoltim N. Shakabpa - 2008
=================================
* Tsoltim N. Shakabpa's magnificent and tantalizing new book, DEAD
PEOPLE TALKING, will soon be released by Paljor Publications in New
Delhi, India.
To inquire about ordering the book, send an e-mail to:
manager@paljorpublications.com
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
Self Determination: A Case for Tibet
The right of peoples to self-determination remains one of the sacrosanct principles of international law in the 20th century. From the American Declaration of Independence (1776) to the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Charter of the United Nations (1945), the General Assembly's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), the International Bill of Rights (1966), and the General Assembly's Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970), all have affirmed to the right to self-determination. Criticisms of its ambiguity and perceived restriction to the context of decolonisation notwithstanding, this right has been aspired to and practiced widely by various groups of people in their fight for political rights, ranging from autonomous status to complete independence in the post-cold war period. The right to self-determination can, therefore, be applied for both internal and external purposes.
The question therefore arises whether Tibetans are entitled to make a legitimate claim to the right to self-determination under international law? Will the realisation of this right for the Tibetans unilaterally lead to secession from the People's Republic of China? To address these questions, we need to understand the legal provisions in respect to the right to self-determination, both in Chinese domestic law as well as international law and to see whether the Tibetans qualify for the right to self-determination.
We also need to define the position of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his Government-in-Exile to resolve the issue of Tibet.
Lenin's view of self-determination
The Chinese concept of self-determination was borrowed from the former Soviet Union. While the principle of self-determination has for long been associated with the popular, democratic will of people, the first half of the twentieth century - when anti-colonial nationalist movements were raging in Asia and Africa - saw anti-imperialist Marxist-Leninists redefining self-determination along the line of decolonisation. The emphasis was shifted from popular will to "national oppression" as a criterion, which implied that applicability of the principle of self-determination was restricted only in the context of colonialism.
Moreover, in Lenin's redefinition, national self-determination in a colonial context meant secession of a territory, while the same principle in a socialist context meant only self-government. This glaring contradiction and inconsistency however didn't stop the principle of self-determination from being enshrined in the Soviet Constitutions of 1924, 1936 and 1977 respectively, each of which recognised the right of each Union Republic "to freely secede from USSR".
The Chinese communists too, in their struggle against capitalist imperialism, imbued Lenin's redefinition of self-determination in their ideology. The principle of self-determination remained a part of the Communist Chinese ideology until 1934, prior to which it had in 1921 envisaged a separate federal republic for Mongolians, Tibetans and Uighurs; and in 1928 promised self-determination for non-Chinese social groups.
The Chinese Communist Party's position on national self-determination for minorities (or nationalities) is clearly reflected in the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic formulated in November 1931: "The Soviet government in China recognises the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority. Thus the Mongols, Moslems, Tibetans, Koreans and others inhabiting the territory of China enjoy the complete right to self-determination, that is, they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer."
The Nationalist China too, under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, initially quite clearly supported the right to self-determination for nationalities inhabiting China. In the manifesto of the first Chinese Nationalist Congress published in 1924, Dr. Sun wrote: "The Kuomintang solemnly declares that the right of self-determination is recognised for all the nationalities inhabiting China; following the victory of the revolution over the imperialists and militarists there will be established a free and united (formed on the basis of a voluntary union of all nationalities) Chinese republic."
The Chinese Nationalists, however, completely abandoned this policy soon, both in theory and practice. Similarly, in the face of Japan's China attack and particularly after the ascendancy of Mao as the undisputed leader in 1934, the Chinese Communist Party's position on the right to self-determination departed from their earlier policy and from Lenin's stand and became closely associated with self-government or regional autonomy.
Thereafter, regional autonomy offered as a political substitute for self-determination has remained the basic policy for resolving the problems of nationalities. The primary driving force behind Mao's denial of self-determination to non-Chinese nationalities was his belief that the new Socialist China must inherit all the territories which were either ruled by imperial China or claimed by it, and that the Chinese are the most revolutionary people and only they can help the non-Chinese nationalities to a higher stage of historical development. Mao later used this stance of racist supremacy as an ideological justification for Chinese hegemony and Chinese expansionism in non-Chinese areas under the banner of autonomous status. Prof. Dawa Norbu argues that if the essence of "regional autonomy" in the context of Communist China is Han hegemony in the name of "Central leadership", and Han expansionism in the name of "development" of "border regions", then it constitutes a serious case of "national operation" (a basic Leninists' criterion for the claim of self-determination in the socialist context).
Self-determination in International Law
Since the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, the principle of self-determination has attained great prominence in international law and politics, so much so that it has been incorporated into numerous international legal instruments of the United Nations including the United Nations' Charter. Both the General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the first articles of the International Covenants, forming part of the International Bill of Rights, declare: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
However, the ambivalence of the provisions of the 1960 Declaration and the failure to define "peoples" both in the Declaration and International Covenants led to the advancement of alternative theories concerning the intended beneficiary.
In reality, the right to self-determination means the right of a people "to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development", the exercise of which can lead to "the establishment of a sovereign and Independent State, free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people". Thus, the right to self-determination is, in fact, more of a procedural than a substantive right. The focus is on the voluntary nature of the decision-making process, rather than on the substantive result, as clearly reflected in the shift in understanding the scope of the right to self-determination and unprecedented events that have unfolded since the end of the Cold War.
As the Honourable Justice Minister Michael Kirby of the International Commission of Jurists has argued, the right to self-determination is not a right which belongs to governments or states, but one that belongs to the people as a "people". The UNESCO Experts Committee on Peoples' Rights holds that there are a number of characteristics by which the existence of a distinct "people" can easily be defined. In their final report and recommendations, the Experts Committee laid down four criteria: (1) A group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following common features: a) A common historical tradition; b) Racial or ethnic identity; c) Cultural homogeneity; d) Linguistic unity; e) Religious or ideological affinity; f) Territorial connection; g) Common economic life. (2) The group must be of a certain number who need not be too large (e.g., the people of micro-states) but must be more than a mere association of individuals within a state. (3) The group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a people-allowing that groups or some members of such groups, though sharing the foregoing characteristics, may not have the will or consciousness. (4) Possibly the group must have institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will of identity.
Self-Determination in Tibet's case
The Tibetan people have a long and undeniably rich common historical recorded tradition in the form of royal chronicles or ancient Tibetan chronicles (rGyalrab) and religious histories (Chos-'byung). There are also numerous authoritative historical works in English based on original Tibetan and other reliable sources. The Tibetan people as a race trace their origin to a monkey (father) and a rock ogress (mother) known in Tibetan as pha spre-wu byan-chub sempa, ma drag-srinmo; this is quite different from the Chinese who credit their racial origin to the "Yellow Emperor".
The Tibetan people enjoy not only a common culture, they also possess a unique civilisation comparable to any other great civilisation of Europe and the East. Tibet's rich culture is not only confined to its geographical boundary, but is spread also India (Ladakh and Sikkim), Nepal, Bhutan, China, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Russia (Buryatia, Tuva and Kalmykia). The Tibetan people enjoy a high degree of linguistic unity-a spoken Tibetan language with several regional dialects which are inter-communicable and an absolutely uniform script, derived from the Indian Gupta Devanagari script. The Tibetan people have a common religion known as Tibetan Buddhism. The multiplicity of schools within Tibetan Buddhism reflects a rich diversity. But all the schools are founded on the teachings in the two Tibetan Buddhist canons, bka-'gyur and bstan-'gyur. The Tibetan people have a common territory which is known in Tibetan as bod kha-wa sGang-chen gyi jong , the Plateau of Tibet (the Chinese now refer to it as Qinghai-Tibet Plateau). Within this geographical location, the Tibetan people over the centuries have created their common ethnogenic myths and historical tradition, cultural and linguistic identity, and common economic life. The Tibetan economy is based on highland agro-nomadic pastoralism, distinctly different from the rice-and-wheat-farming of the traditional Chinese economy.
As for the fulfillment of the remaining three criteria in the Tibetan case, The Tibetan population of six million (the number even acknowledged by the PRC) is a sizeable number to be entitled to claim to be a "people" under the international law; The Tibetan people have been expressing their common characteristics through the institution of bod bShung dGa lDen pho drang pyChokle rNam rGyal (the Tibetan Government) headed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, their spiritual and temporal leader, since the year 1642; and as for the consciousness (or will of the people) of being a "people", even Tibetans who have been forced out of their homeland for nearly half a century remain deeply conscious that they are part and parcel of the Tibetan race and Tibetan tradition. A similar consciousness has also been demonstrated more strongly, at the risk of greater repercussion, by the Tibetan people inside Tibet.
The above facts clearly demonstrate that the Tibetans are a distinct people under international law, fully entitled to the right to self-determination. This fact was endorsed by the London Conference of International Lawyers on Issues Relating to Self-Determination and Independence for Tibet in January 1993. The United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution (1991/10) E/CN.4/1992/37 of January 5, 1992 not only endorsed that the Tibetan people are a distinct people under international law, but also observed that "Tibet is an occupied country" and "Tibetans are a people under colonial or alien domination".
Although the international legal instruments of the United Nations clearly state that "all peoples enjoy the right to self-determination, international law restricts the application of this right, at least as a peremptory norm, to peoples under colonial domination and exploitation or under alien subjugation.
The concept of alien subjugation has not been greatly explored by international legal experts, but in general it is accepted that the concept of alien subjugation is wider in scope than the classical decolonisation cases. The United Nations has applied the concept of alien subjugation in relation to the Palestinian people in the Israeli Occupied Territories, Cambodia under Vietnam, Namibia under South Africa, Kuwait under Iraq, all outside the context of European colonialism.
In the post-Cold War era, the Tibetan case has similarities with both Kuwait and the Baltic States. But while the people of Kuwait regained their right to self-determination and independence from Iraq with strong support from the United States in the form of military action, mandated by the United Nations Security Council resolution 678 (1990), the Tibetan issue has remain unresolved because China, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, easily vetoes any move challenging its interest. But, whatever the present situation may be, Tibet was an independent country on the eve of the Chinese invasion in 1949-50 and the Chinese occupation of Tibet is not only illegal, it also constitutes an act of "aggression" in the context of international law. Such illegal acquisition of territory is not permissible under the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration of Friendly Relations, and the 1974 Definition of Aggression.
When the Baltic States seceded from the former Soviet Union, the international community viewed their situation as qualitatively different from other Soviet Republics, because of their prior existence as independent states-a status which was undone by a coerced treaty of annexation. Based on this argument, the Baltic people were able to define their circumstances as a form of alien occupation, adding a legal force to their political claims to self-determination. Likewise, Tibet had remained an independent state before the Chinese invasion and occupation, and it was annexed to China under a forced treaty.
Therefore, the concept of alien occupation and alien subjugation are very relevant to Tibet. In fact, Richard Falk, Professor of International Law and Practice and Fellow at the Center for International Studies, Princeton University (USA), strongly believes that the Tibet case is stronger than the Baltic Republics' case. Prof. Falk stated that reservations about the application of self-determination are irrelevant in the case of Tibet and the reality of Tibet as a country essentially occupied by a foreign power must be appreciated.
During the UN General Assembly debates on Tibet in 1959, 1961 and 1965, many delegates asserted that the Tibetans formed a distinct people whose traditional autonomy or independence was threatened by the alien rule imposed by China. In 1959, El Salvador denounced the "invasion of Tibet by foreign forces" and New Zealand referred specially to the prohibition against subjecting a people to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. In 1961, Ireland considered the terms of GA resolution 1514 on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people applicable to Tibet as Tibetans constituted a people subjected to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. In 1965, Costa Rica considered the situation in Tibet as one of neo-imperialism and called upon the UN to assist Tibet to "throw off the yoke of foreign domination". The Philippines, India, Thailand, Ireland and New Zealand also gave similar statements. These debates, and the 1961 UN General Assembly resolution on Tibet calling for the "cessation of practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination", show that the Tibetan question was considered in the context of a distinct people under alien subjugation and domination.
China's fear of secession and Tibetan Self-Determination
That Tibet was an independent country invaded by the PRC through military force and that its current status under international law is that of a country under alien subjugation remain without doubt. But, more important than the historical position is the popular will of the people, which has now become a new foundation of the political claim or the legitimacy of governmental control over peoples in the modern world. The Tibetan people have frequently demonstrated their will or consciousness through a series of peaceful pro-independence demonstrations in 1959, 1969, the 1980s and 1990s in Tibet. This in itself entitles the Tibetan people to make a legitimate claim to total independence or secession from the PRC.
However, responding positively to the 1979 offer of Deng Xiaoping to discuss anything "other than independence" and also considering the long-term benefit to both the Chinese and Tibetan people, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal head of the six million Tibetans, came out with the most modest, "middle-way" solution to the Sino-Tibetan conflict. In his 1987 Five-Point Peace Plan for Tibet announced on Capitol Hill in Washington DC, the Dalai Lama called for the conversion of Tibet into a zone of peace, respect for the Tibetan people's human rights and democratic ideals, protection of Tibet's fragile environment, a halt to the Chinese population transfer into Tibet, and earnest negotiations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. A framework for the negotiations on the future of Tibet was laid down in his speech to the European Parliament at Strasbourg in the following year; this later came to be popularly known as the Strasbourg Proposal. In the proposal, His Holiness the Dalai Lama demanded that "the whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China". The proposal further stated that "the government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's Foreign Policy". The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposal demanded only internal self-determination and renounced the idea of separating Tibet from China.
Although the international community applauded the initiative as a reasonable approach, Beijing reacted negatively to the Strasbourg Proposal and the Five-Point Peace Plan announced earlier by saying that "both attempt to tamper with history, distort reality, and deny Tibet's status as an inalienable part of China's territory under Chinese sovereignty". Beijing labelled the Strasbourg Proposal "independence in disguise" and declared that "the independence, semi-independence, and disguised independence of Tibet will not do and the People's Republic of China will not make any concession on the question of sovereignty".
There may be some basis for the Chinese misgivings over the proposal. As "free association or associated statehood" is the basis of future relationship with China laid down in the Proposal, the United Nations' General Assembly resolution 742 (VIII) of 1953 and 1541 (XV) of 1960 clearly states that the people of an associated State retain the right to modify unilaterally its status by democratic means, presumably toward independence. But this inference should not pose any obstacle to Sino-Tibetan dialogues and should not serve as a basis for apprehension among the Chinese leadership. His Holiness has repeatedly made it public that he is "not fighting for complete independence or separation from China". He made it categorically clear at the Second International Conference of Tibet Support Groups in Bonn (Germany) in June 1996. He told his supporters that: "…if my main goal or objective were to pursue total independence then I could adopt a position of claiming independence for the areas governed by the Tibetan Government before 1950. But my main concern is the protection of Tibetan culture, because the Tibetan culture has the potential to create a peaceful human society, a compassionate society at peace with nature and the environment".
Similarly, in his March 10, 1999 political statement to the international public and the Tibetan people both in and outside Tibet, he stated clearly that: "I sincerely believe that my 'Middle Way Approach' will contribute to stability and unity of the People's Republic of China and secure the right for the Tibetan people to live in freedom, peace and dignity…a just and fair solution to the issue of Tibet will enable me to give full assurance that I will use my moral authority to persuade the Tibetans not to seek separation". These statements clearly indicate that His Holiness the Dalai Lama is serious, consistent and sincere in his terms.
Moreover, if Tibetans enjoy meaningful self-rule, a genuine form of autonomy, and if there exists a self-regulatory mechanism for the resolution of differences, then these safeguard internal self-determination in the fullest sense, which is what His Holiness the Dalai Lama is demanding for the six million Tibetans. His demand is genuine in the sense that the right to self-determination is not the right entitled to a State, but to a people. In other words, the Dalai Lama is willing to forego the demand for a complete secession from the PRC if all the Tibetans living on the Plateau of Tibet are given a genuine right to internal self-determination.
His Proposal reflects that he is a moderate and pragmatic leader, who is keen to resolve the Sino-Tibetan conflict peacefully bearing in mind the long-term benefit to both the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. Most importantly, he is the only leader who commands total loyalty of six million Tibetans and could persuade them to accept a settlement which falls short of total independence. In his absence, it will be very difficult to resolve the conflict through dialogues and negotiations. Thus, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is Beijing's best bet for resolving the Tibet issue without a separation from China.
Tsewang Phuntsok
Friday, June 6, 2008
Bird Lessons
I believe one doesn't have to be a rocket scientist to realize that even a mild criticism, leave alone peaceful and non-violent independence demonstrations like chanting "Tibet is independent", "long live the Dalai Lama", against the Chinese regime will subject one to rigorous imprisonment and, worse, violent deaths from the whole apparatus of the PLA machinery. Still Tibetans in Tibet, knowing full well the grave consequences of their actions, rose up against the Chinese and sacrificed their lives so that the spirit of Tibet remains alive and our children live in peace, freedom and dignity.
Tibetans living in free countries have done a lot to show their solidarity by organizing all kinds of non-violent protests to highlight the attention of the world community to the killing mines in Tibet. However, the question that remains to be asked among ourselves is this: have we, as Tibetans living in free countries, done enough for our brothers and sisters back in Tibet? Can we Tibetans, who came into exile with the solemn pledge that we will work for Tibet's freedom, do more than what we are doing right now?
I have no doubt that the majority of us Tibetans in exile will have a negative answer to these questions. Deep down in our hearts and minds, whether we accept it or not, we know that we have not done enough for our cause. We know that we should do more, and wish to do more, but we seem to be, to quote His Holiness, helpless. In other words, our concern for Tibet remains just within the confines of our minds only!
Speaking from the context of a nation, Tibetans killed by the Chinese in recent protests were our brothers and sisters, members of a same family, sharing a same language, religion and culture, called Bhod. What should be our response when our own family members, be it our age-old parents or just a new born baby, is attacked by a rabies-infested dog? Should we counsel patience and compassion or should we strike the beast down without any show of mercy? I got my answer when I was watching a program on discovery channel last night. It was about what the biologists call defensive mechanism that is inherent in every species when they are preyed upon by powerful predators.
The program showed a bird guarding her chickens in the nest. A serpent suddenly pops up from nowhere to gobble up the little chicks. The mother, the bird, without any second thoughts about the venous snake, strikes back at the merciless predator!
Tenzin Nyinjey
Thursday, December 27, 2007
In Hope
“So what is the latest?” the elderly Tibetan asked. “We might soon have to return to Tibet and you, my old man might need to sell your things on discount”, I replied. “Its all due to the mercy of Chenrezig,” the man in reply closed his eyes and folded his hands. “It is an optimistic time,” he murmured as I bid good night.
A little too soon? For then the news came of Lobsang Dhondup’s execution.
Lobsang Dhondup was executed recently by the Chinese on flimsy charges. To date, neither the court nor the Beijing authorities have been able to substantiate or admit to the real reason behind this cruel act.
Lobsang Dhondup was probably shot in the back of his head at point blank range, to make the execution efficient and the result a surety. Probably his passing away was quick. Maybe it was painless. But I am sure it was terrifying. A close friend asked, “I wonder what was on his mind, right at that moment?” I shudder to think.
What would be going through the mind of a young man, condemned to die for something he did not do. Condemned to death for the sake of an occupying forces’ politics and power games. Sure, he is far from the first Tibetan to die for such reasons, and even further from being the first ever person to die in this manner, but when it is your life that is forfeit, I am sure that those facts are not the ones foremost in your mind at the time. Was he wondering why was he being executed? Why he was the one picked? Was he a victim of the new leadership in Beijing, wanting to send a clear political message?
What would it feel like to walk across the killing ground to the last place you would stand in this life? Or did they just come into his cell and end it there? Buddhism teaches the cycle of life, the turning path of our lifetimes, but as one not extensively trained in the high reaches of monastic disciplines, how much fear was there during his last moments, hours, days? Or in the end, did he see himself dying for his country and proud to offer literally everything he had for this cause?
The truth? Well, of course we will never know, or come anywhere close to knowing. I wondered about simpler things. Lobsang Dhondup’s young life was cut short by the Chinese - he was but 28 years of age He was just few months older than me, living in a country that I have never yet seen. What dreams might he have had? What plans? Where did he think his future was going to take him? To the gallows or to a Free Tibet? To a life later in exile, or a quiet existence watching his family grow up around him? Had he hoped to become a successful businessman, and if so, where would that have led him? Or was he content living each day as it came?
I have lived my life in exile, aware of the Tibetan situation since young. My hopes, my dreams; they may be similar to those of my friends’ here around me, they may not. How different are they though to those of my brethren living inside my unseen homeland? I have an education, many of them do not. I can speak out about what I think without fear of ending up incarcerated, or dead like Lobsang Dhondup. Many within Tibet are politically active, like us here, but run far greater risks. So how do our dreams, our thoughts, our lives differ? Do we see the same futures, the same dreams, but through different eyes? Or do we see different dreams and a different future through the same eyes? Will we meet in our current lifetimes? Will we ever get the chance to compare our thoughts, our hopes, our passions?
I have to believe that we will. I have to believe that all that we fight for, all the suffering that so many have endured, all that so many have sacrificed, will achieve what we aim for in the end, in the not too far distant future. I want to know that lives given have not been used up and thrown away, but are pebbles on the road to freedom. I believe that all the work that I, that my friends, that so many around the world have contributed, will succeed in the end. That the efforts, dreams, and deeds of thousands will prevail, that sanity and peace will return to the high plateau and deep river valleys. And that I will see my homeland, that I will meet my family, my unknown cousins, and my yet un-met friends. That one day we will sit together in the high, rocky mountains around my father’s village and discuss our thoughts, our dreams, and our new plans for the future.
Tenam
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
Tears of Regret Flow Uncontrollably
cows;
When a charming, slender girl does not marry but is used by a swindler;
When a beautiful bride does not fit into her new household and is abandoned
to roam in unknown, distant lands-
Oh - how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
When a white-haired old man does not know the alphabet but recites mantras
for this life and the next;
When a white-toothed young man does not know the four vowels but adorns his
chest with gold ornaments;
When a pure-hearted monk does not know how to punctuate sentences but
conducts rituals in the home-
Oh-how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
When the children of farmers and herders aren't sent to school but spend
their time with flocks of goats and sheep;
When the schoolyard is empty of students but full of grass and weeds;
When the classroom walls crumble in the rain while the teacher revels in
drink-
Oh-how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
When the field of culture is trampled under the hooves of those who
disparage it;
When the flower garden of education withers in the drought of
conservatism;
When the peachlike face of literature is infested by swarms of ravenous
insects-
Oh-how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
When the broad heart of the snowy mountains is covered with filthy dust and
sand;
When the courageous peaks of the rocky mountains are split apart by
black-beaked crows;
When the wisdom of the grassy mountains' fertile slopes is undermined by
thousands of gophers-
Oh-how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
When the stallion of progress and knowledge is bound tightly by the hobbles
of domination;
When the white yak of freedom is chained by the nose to a hybrid yak-cow and
made subservient to her;
When the sheep of peace and happiness are exploited for profit and sheared
again and again-
Oh-how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
When incomparable geniuses wander as beggars in foreign lands;
When unprecedented idiots sit upon the thrones of brilliant scholars;
When savages control the wise and knowledgeable-
Oh-how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
When the pure river of an untainted history is contaminated with the salty
water of distortion;
When the unblemished vow on the face of a stone monument is defaced with
one-sided views;
When the incomparably white pool of the five sciences becomes the playground
for lying frogs-
Oh-how tears of regret flow uncontrollably from my eyes!
-- Lhagyal Tsering
Thursday, December 13, 2007
Invasion of Tibet and fall of Chamdo
In the meanwhile, the PLA marched into eastern Tibet and circulated a ten-point document, asking Tibetans to cooperate with China in “liberating” Tibet from foreign imperialists. This struck as a curious statement to the Tibetan government who knew that there were fewer than ten foreigners in the country. It responded by making a series of radio announcements stating that there were no foreign imperialists on Tibetan soil, that Tibet had never been part of China, and that if China invaded Tibet just as big insects eat small ones, Tibet would fight back even if it were reduced to the female population.(5)
At the same time, the Tibetan government decided to send a delegation, consisting of two senior officials—Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa and Tsechag Thubten Gyalpo—and five assistants to negotiate with the PRC in a third country, possibly the USSR, Singapore or Hong Kong. China suggested Hong Kong as the venue, to which the Tibetan government agreed and directed its delegation to discuss the Foreign Office letter to Chairman Mao Zedong and the threatening Chinese radio announcements about an imminent “liberation of Tibet”. The government also instructed the delegation to secure the Chinese assurance that the territorial integrity of Tibet would not be violated, and to drive home the point that Tibet would not tolerate Chinese interference.(6)
On March 7, 1950 the delegates reached Kalimpong en route to Delhi. On reaching Delhi, they ran into an unforeseen problem: the British would not issue them the visas to travel to Hong Kong, probably because they did not want to antagonise China as the visa would have to be stamped on the passport issued by the Tibetan government. Thus, in June 1950 the Tibetan government instructed its delegates to hold negotiations in Delhi. The Chinese did not want this and suggested that the Tibetans should come to Beijing after a preliminary round of talks in Delhi with their new Ambassador to India.(7)
In the course of the negotiation, the Chinese Ambassador, Yuan Zhong Xian, demanded that the Tibetan delegation accept a three-point proposal: i) Tibet should be recognised as part of China ii) Tibetan national defence will be handled by China; iii) Tibet’s political and trade relations with foreign countries must be conducted through China. They were then to proceed to Beijing in confirmation of the “agreement”.
The Tibetan government instructed the delegates to reject the Chinese proposal, particularly the first point. So the negotiation was suspended. By then China had already started its military offensive on Chamdo, eastern Tibet’s provincial capital. It happened on October 7, 1950 when Commanders Wang Qimei and Zhang Guohua led 40,000 PLA troops from the South-West Military Region in an eight-pronged attack on Chamdo. The Tibetan force, numbering 8,000 troops, engaged the PLA troops in fierce battles. By October 19 the Tibetans had fought 21 battles and lost over 5,700 men.(8) Chamdo fell to the PLA and Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, provincial governor, was captured.(9)
The Chinese aggression came as a rude shock to India. In a sharp note to Beijing on October 26, 1950, the Indian Foreign Ministry wrote: “Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by Chinese government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there naturally will be fear on the part of Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.”(10) A number of countries, including the United States and Britain, expressed their support for the Indian position.
Back in Lhasa, the Tibetan Government decided to secure the UN mediation on Tibet’s behalf. It wrote to the UN Secretary General on November 11, 1950, appealing for the world body’s intervention. The letter said, in part: “Tibet recognises that it is in no position to resist the Chinese advance. It is thus that it agreed to negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese Government...Though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men trained to war, we understand that the United Nations has decided to stop aggression wherever it takes place.”(11)
The Tibetan National Assembly convened an emergency session and requested the Dalai Lama, only fifteen (12) at that time, to assume full authority as head of state and move his government temporarily to Dromo (Yatung), near the Indian border, so that he would be out of personal danger. At the same time the Tibetan Foreign Office issued the following statement: “Tibet is united as one man behind the Dalai Lama who has taken over full powers ... We have appealed to the world for peaceful intervention in (the face of this) clear case of unprovoked aggression.”(13)
On November 17, 1950 the Dalai Lama assumed power at a formal ceremony and wrote to Mao Zedong: “The relationship between Tibet and China has deteriorated during my minority. Now that I have taken responsibility, I wish to revive the past harmonious relationship between us.” The Dalai Lama asked Mao to release the Tibetan prisoners of war and withdraw Chinese troops from the Tibetan territory.(14)
On that very day El Salvador formally asked that the aggression against Tibet be put on the UN General Assembly agenda. However, the issue was not discussed in the UN General Assembly at the suggestion of the Indian delegation who asserted that a peaceful solution which was mutually advantageous to Tibet, India and China could be reached between the parties concerned. A second letter by the Tibetan delegation to the United Nations on December 8, 1950 did not change the situation.
Wednesday, December 12, 2007
Between homeland and exile
For the first time since the Chinese occupation, Tibet opened to the world in the early'80s. in the first year, probably more Westerner set foot in Tibet than had ever in all its history. For the first time after 30 years, relatives inside and outside Tibet were meeting. Like the Berlin Wall coming down, it was a very dramatic and exciting time.
I was a student in America then. I remember the small group of Tibetans gathering at he Office of Tibet to listen with great emotion to those who returned from visiting Tibet recounts their experience. Tibet was hardly ever in the media then, in the United States or anywhere else.
For me, awareness of who I was a Tibetan and an exile came relatively late, when I was in college in America. I had spent most of my childhood, most of 10 years, ensconced in a Presbyterian boarding school in Kalimpong near Darjeeling Dr. Graham's Homes had been founder for orphans of Anglo-Indians, so I grew up mainly with Anglo-Indians, but also Bhutanese, Sikkimese, other Tibetans, Nepalis, Nagas, Lushai, Khansi.
In college in America I read vociferously books about Tibet, and studied some Buddhist philosophy with Robert Thurman. It was with such bookish knowledge that I discovered and began to articulate my identity as a Tibetan. Sheer passion marked my knowledge for Tibet, albeit from a distance. And passion and distance often defines the exile.
In 1985, a few years after I returned to Kathmandu, my chance came to go to Tibet. Ironically, it was as a tour guide, an appointment that seemed to mock the gravitas of my exile identity.
At the outset of my trip an incident occurred that was to foreshadow my later journey to my hometown. I met my first Tibetans at a temple in Chengdu where we were sighseeing before flying into Tibet. There were crowds of Chinese tourists. Since religion had been banned for three or four decades, the Buddhist temple was an exotica. Out of the milling crowds emerged a Tibetan family. They were wearing Tibetan clothing, the woment's braided hair sported turquoise and amber. They were obviously exotic to the Chinese, who were following them. Someone from my group said, "Wow! Who are they?"
Excited, I approached them. To my utter surprise, they spoke to me in Chinese. I tried again they spoke back in Chinese. Finally, the man acknowledged in Tibetan that they were Tibetan, and then reverted to Chinese. I walked away disappointed, disturbed.
In 1987 I finally visited my hometown, Gyelthang. It is farflung in the southeastern tip of the Tibetan plateau, 1,600 km from Lhasa. Like most of Kham, it is now part of a Chinese province, Yunnan. It is close to Chinese lands, near the homes of numerous ethnic groups called "minority nationalities" by the Chinese. I didn't know much about Gyelthang for I had grown up in exile. The little I knew of it was from my mother- my father having died somewhat young- and my fellow Gyelthang people, who made up my community in exile.
I was going in with a certain notion of Tibet based on an image in exiles' minds. This identity largely subscribed to a hegemonic central Tibetan concept of the Tibetan nation. Thus, even we eastern Tibetans were likely to look to Lhasa, its mountains, monasteries, its lakes and rivers, central Tibetan songs and language, as constituting the components of Tibetan hood.
While the idea of a distinct Tibetan civilisation is powerful and alive, that of Tibet as a perfectly homogenised pan- Tibetan entity took root in exile, primarily a political condition. The identity I had come to assume was, in a sense, generic, shaped by a new kind of nationalism forged in exile.
This was fine and perhaps inevitable, except those outlying, marginal places like Gyelthang had peculiarities that didn't fit into this picture. Thus, aspects of our regional idiosyncrasies and our "local" history were given short shrift.
What the exile Tibetan encounters and reacts to most strongly when he or she sets foot in Tibet is the phenomena of sinicisation, which is all- pervasive- precisely because it shakes up some of our assumptions and idealisations. These features of sinicisation are encountered as part of the daily fabric of life by the Tibetans who took my mediocre Tibetan to be the Lhasa dialect. In the prefectural capital where people held secular jobs, they tended to speak more Chinese than they did Tibetan.
It was evident why that was so. The vehicle of sinicisation was potent, all pervasive, embodied in the institutions of State and society, of the affairs of the public domain, the work culture, schools, post offices, bus stations and bus timings. Because the vocabulary of everyday reality was in Chinese, even those who were fluent in Gyelthang language, more fluent than I was reverted or resorted to Chinese. As for the Gyelthang language, it had been relegated to the hearth, tucked within domestic confines, a reflection of a culture on the retreat.
During my three-month stay, I witnessed the 30th anniversary of the founding of the autonomous prefecture of Dechen, of which my hometown was capital. There was pageantry, a parade of troops in their full regalia; there were horse races, fireworks, openings of new buildings- some in exaggeratedly Tibetan style. Crowds came to the parade, to hear the speeches, to see the fireworks and the balloons, to see the props in technicolour. Exhibits were displayed to mark the progress and the targets to achieve by the year 2000.
I was unnerved by the seeming willingness of the Gyelthang and Dechen folk of partake. Could this be real? Tibetans celebrating the Chinese consolidation of their presence in Tibet? Could they not see through the bluff, I wondered. On the other hand, they seemed-light-hearted. Was it just a mela, a tamasha, as it might be called in India, a happening of no significance?
On my last night, at a family dinner, one of my cousins handed me a brightly wrapped package. It was from the head of the People's Association. It was a new picture book of Gyelthang released the day before, and pamphlets in Chinese about the region's progress. My cousin hesitated a moment. Then he said, "Don't mix with the wrong people in India."
I felt the blood to my face. When would they get it? I would return the package, make my point in front of them all. My gentle cousin, only the messenger, seemed to have no inkling of how I felt. It dawned on me that we belonged no to different systems but to different enclosures, entirely different realities. The chasm between us was immense. I was from the outside- wherever Tibetan exiles lived. China was the adversary, a cosmic one, a central point of reference in our self-definition, built on the premise of exile. The sad truth was that the occupation of Tibet, the determining reality for us, lay outside the angle of vision of my cousin and many Gyelthang folk. It was not that they were pro-china or anti-Tibet; rather, the political discourse that defined us did not have the same significance or simply registered minisculely for them.
Not surprisingly, where I felt most at home was where the real bastion of Tibetan culture lay, at the monastery. It was the clergy that had fallen drastically from grace, it was monks who had suffered the greatest violation of their worldview. The sinicisation I encountered made me decry the loss and the betrayal of things Tibetan. I had become the tradition-holder or defender of it, notwithstanding the shaky grounds of this position. On my first visit there, an uneasy quiet reigned. A few pilgrims went about hesitantly, as if unsure of the rituals of daily worship. The monks seemed furtive, like victims, or like fugitives on the run.
Like many in Tibet, Gyelthang's monastery had been razed to rubble during the state-endorsed hooliganism called the "Cultural Revolution". Lamas and monks had been tortured, killed; there had been wholesale destruction and looting of religious paraphernalia. Then in the '80s, following the touted religious freedom that came with Deng Xiaoping's reforms, the hill-site had come to life with the reconstruction of the monastery; there were now several hundred monks.
I met a monk whose passionate hatred of the Chinese authorities had nothing in common with the pasture of reasonableness the office-going Tibetans inhabited. "Our Gyelthang youth are blind. Because they read and write a little Chinese, they think they know it all. They think us fools".
I had met Thupten and his relatives en route to Buddhist sites in India. From his foray south of the Himalaya, Thupten had glimpsed in exile a radiant vision of Tibet. A vision of Tibet that seemed able to rebut the Chinese chauvinistic view of it. In exile, he had found Tibetan Buddhist tradition alive and flourishing and, most of all, spread worldwide. There were religious initiations, grand monasteries, a self-confident clergy, dharma books, foreigners clad in monks' robes, and foreign statesmen saluting the Dalai Lama. Millions followed the dharma, and there were lamas and dharma centres all around the world. The spirit of Buddhism outside Tibet was more powerful than anything he had ever seen. Thupten had carried these impressions back to the small world at the edge of the Tibetan plateau, to continue his uphill battle with the "enemies of the faith".
The enclosure of Gyelthang jolted me into seeing who the seeker was. It was there, when everything seemed upside down, that I saw how much "I " was made up of my own yearnings and sense of loss. I believed I could be alive only as a Tibetan exile, right to my bones, blood, senses. To be Tibetan, to be against the Chinese, the cosmic nemesis; to be Tibetan Buddhist, not American or European; I could partake of other worlds, yet remain separate; it was an advantageous, wonderfully elastic, identity, allowing more than one way of being.
I realised that much of my indignation and anger came because my experience in Gyelthang shattered the idealised notions of Tibet I had held. Doubly so because I myself did not meet this high idealisation. Only when I allowed it, did I see that their sinicisation and loss of tradition were aspects of their daily life, not ideological, part of the normalcy of their own enclosure. Theirs was not a pro-China position, as mine was not a disavowal of Tibetan culture. In both enclosures, inside Tibet and outside, profound changes had occurred, the claim of different nuclei, modernisation, the world itself. Forty years is a short time historically, a long time in anyone's life.
Kesang Tsetan has authored a book on his travel to Tibet. He has also written the script for Tsering Rhitar's Nepalese feature film, Mukundo
Aspects of Autonomy: a Study in Autonomous Arrangements Around the World
For over a decade, His Holiness the Dalai Lama has publicly stated that he seeks to negotiate "genuine self-government" or "genuine self-rule" for Tibet within the context of the Chinese state. His Holiness's position responds to the late Deng Xiaopeng's comments that everything is negotiable except for independence and takes into account the fact that time is running out for the Tibetan culture's survival in occupied Tibet. No doubt, His Holiness's decision to seek a resolution short of independence is strongly influenced by His assessment of the relative political and economic strengths of China and Tibet and the international community's long-standing failure to stand up for Tibetan independence.
Self-government of a people (such as the Tibetans) within the framework of a sovereign state is generally referred to as autonomy. Few political terms evoke stronger and more heated reactions in the Tibetan community than that of autonomy. This, of course, is not a surprise given that Tibetans have suffered unspeakable human rights violations and cultural destruction in the so-called Tibet "Autonomous" Region (TAR), where Tibetans have minimal rights to govern themselves in theory and virtually none in practice. On the other hand, the self-government or autonomy proposed by His Holiness, in His 1988 Strasbourg statement, provides for Tibetan control over most matters affecting Tibet. If autonomy can take such different forms, what then is autonomy?
Despite the fact that well over 40 autonomous arrangements have been created in the 20th century, the term "autonomy" has no generally accepted meaning in international law. One autonomous arrangement can be completely different from the next. Autonomy is a vague, if not meaningless, concept unless and until it is defined on a case-by-case basis as a particular distribution of governmental powers between two governments: The government of the people who seek self-government, usually referred to as the autonomous government, and the government of the sovereign or larger state, which I will refer to as the state government. Some of the major governmental powers which must be addressed in the drafting of an autonomous agreement are the power to control cultural affairs, education, the official language, national symbols, health and social services, the economy, taxation, natural resources, environmental policy, transportation, postal and telecommunication systems, law and order, administration of justice, currency and monetary policy, determination of citizenship, foreign policy, defense, passports and visas, customs, border control and immigration, as well as political rights.
By the same token, taking a position for or against autonomy is somewhat meaningless, unless the autonomy proposed or opposed is specifically defined as a particular distribution of governmental powers. This is because "autonomy" can provide for an allocation of power to the autonomous government that approaches virtual independence, as it does in the case of Liechtenstein and Andorra, or virtual subjugation, as it does in the case of the present Tibet Autonomous Region.
The International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet (ICLT) recently prepared a study of 34 autonomous arrangements and analysed the distribution of governmental powers in each case. To avoid any misunderstandings, I would like to make it clear that this study does not suggest that Tibetans should adopt one model of autonomy over another, for each situation is historically, politically, socially, economically and culturally unique. Nor does ICLT or I take the position that Tibetans should attempt to negotiate an autonomous arrangement with China, rather than pursue independence or other options. Rather, the intent of the study is to illustrate how autonomy has been practiced in various situations around the world, to show what distributions of governmental powers are possible and importantly to point out various issues which must be addressed if an autonomous arrangement is to be successful.
Tibetans, as a distinct people, have the right to self-determination, that is to decide on their future political, social and economic status. Pursuant to that right, Tibetans are entitled to choose a particular form of autonomy, independence, or they could theoretically opt to become fully integrated into the Chinese state. What options the Tibetans choose and how they make that choice, whether through their elected officials in exile, by decision of His Holiness the Dalai Lama or through a popular referendum, is up to them. It is important to note that the option is not between self-determination and independence, or between self-determination and autonomy (sometimes referred to as the "Middle Way" by His Holiness). Rather the option is between various forms of autonomy, independence or, theoretically, integration into the Chinese state. The right to self-determination is the legal basis for these options, not an option in itself. As Tibetans are well aware, unfortunately, rights under international law are not uniformly enforced and appropriate enforcement mechanisms have yet to be put in place. Thus even though Tibetans have the legal right to choose their future political status, this choice is restrained by the political realities of China and Tibet and by the political will of the international community.
Currently the Tibetan government is examining the option of some form of autonomy for Tibet and hopes to engage the Chinese government in negotiations in this regard. It is therefore important for Tibetans to inform themselves and to consider the various possibilities for division of governmental powers in an autonomous arrangement for self-governance. The following brief summary highlights the major governmental powers which must be considered in negotiating an autonomous arrangement and it highlights how other peoples have resolved the allocation of these powers.
CULTURAL AFFAIRS
Cultural preservation lies at the foundation of almost every struggle for self-determination. The power over cultural affairs is the only governmental function over which each and every autonomous government studied has control. In some cases, however, such as the TAR and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, this control is a matter of right, but not of practice.
EDUCATION
In the great majority of the situations studied, education is entirely controlled by the autonomous government. Most autonomous governments insist on controlling education in order to guarantee survival of the native language and the cultural identity of their people. For example, the Swedish speaking Aland Islands, an autonomous province of Finland under the 1991 Act of Autonomy for Aland, administer their own schools, where instruction is in Swedish, with English as a second language. Finish is offered as an optional language.
Several examples underscore the importance of providing sufficient second language instruction, especially in remote regions, so as to open post-secondary school educational opportunities to students. In Micronesia, an associated state of the United States (US) under the 1982 Compact of Free Association, education is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the autonomous government. Students are taught in each of the applicable Micronesian languages and English is required as a second language. Due to the geographical isolation and the low quality of some of the English instruction, however, many Micronesians graduate without proficiency in English. Because relatively few books are available in the Micronesian languages, educational levels remain low and students are not adequately prepared for a college education, which is only available abroad.
The TAR is one of the few examples where the autonomous government does not have ultimate control over education. It may plan and implement educational programs but does not have ultimate control since all such programs must comply with Chinese state guidelines.
OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
Language is a key component of cultural identity and control over language is often critical to effective self-governance. In some autonomous arrangements the state's language is the sole official language, as in the TAR, where the official language is Mandarin. In others, the language of the people is the only official language, as in Kashmir where the official language is Urdu. Similarly in Quebec the official language is French even though the rest of Canada is English speaking. In some cases, such as the Aland Islands, the people's language is the official language, but translation from and into the state's language is available for certain official business. A number of autonomous arrangements provide for several official languages so as to meet the needs of the people and the state.Such arrangements are found in Hong Kong, the Cook Islands, Micronesia, Belgium, Greenland, Scotland, Tatarstan, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Puerto Rico.
NATIONAL SYMBOLS
To many peoples, national symbols, such as flags, seals and anthems, are a vital and critical part of their identity. Therefore, most peoples do have their own national symbolism. Prohibitions of national symbols are found only rarely, except in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which entered into a peace agreement with Bangladesh in 1997, the TAR and Northern Ireland.
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES
In many cases, health care and social services are provided by the people's autonomous governments. For example, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein, South Tyrol, Kashmir, Tatarstan, Scotland, San Marino, Puerto Rico, the Netherlands Antilles, Basque Country, Catalonia, Andorra and Gibraltar all have exclusive control over these functions. An unsuccessful example of people's control over health care is found in Zanzibar which has insufficient funds to adequately provide for its population's needs. As a result there have been outbreaks of epidemics due to lack of potable water and inadequate sewage and electrical systems.
While health care and social services are inherently internal affairs issues, in many cases they are a function of the state, in part, for financial reasons. In Quebec health care is within the autonomous government's jurisdiction, but Quebec has transferred responsibility for health and social services to the Canadian federal government because the financial burden was too large for the autonomous government. Similarly, the Faroese have chosen to share that power with the Danish government in order to benefit from its technology and financial resources. Others, including the people of the Aland Islands, Cook Islands, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Micronesia and Northern Ireland, have sole control over health care delivery but with the support of the state by way of subsidies.
ECONOMY
Many autonomous governments have sole or substantial control over their economy. Development of and control of the economy is essential to building a financial base for self-governance. The study shows that there is a high correlation between an autonomous government's degree of economic control and the health of the economy, on one hand, and the level of self-governance exercised by the autonomous government on the other hand.
For example, Tatarstan's oil reserves and strong military industry positioned Tatarstan to successfully negotiate a bilateral treaty with the Russian Federation, which guarantees to Tatarstan substantial powers of self-governance not enjoyed by other members of the Russian Federation. Liechtenstein, though one of the smallest European countries, has highly profitable electronics, metal, pharmaceutical, ceramics and textile industries, as well as lucrative tourism. It is a sovereign state which has chosen a mutually beneficial associated statehood relationship with Switzerland since 1923.
Economic power can also be successfully shared. In Quebec, for example, intra-provincial business is controlled by Quebec, while inter-provincial trade is controlled by the federal government. In the Basque Country, Spain exercises control over foreign trade, banking and insurance, while the Basque autonomous government controls all other aspects of the economy. In some cases state subsidies provide autonomous governments with substantial economic control. The Aland Islands, for example, control their port and shipping industry but require and receive substantial economic aid from Finland.
Lack of a viable economy leads to dependency in many other areas, as demonstrated by the case of the Navajo Nation. Similarly, in the TAR, where the economy is controlled by the state, lack of local control over the economy, a weak economy and a low level of autonomy go hand in hand.
TAXATION
The power to tax is vital to the control of the economy and government services. There is a strong correlation between taxing powers and substantial autonomy. Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Micronesia, Liechtenstein, Greenland, Palestine, Puerto Rico and the Cook Islands have exclusive taxing powers. Some autonomous governments may levy taxes with respect to matters within their jurisdiction, while states often reserve the powers to tax on matters of state-wide interest. In an interesting twist, some autonomous governments use their taxing power to attract commerce by creating tax-free heavens within their jurisdiction. This is the case in Andorra. The TAR is one of the very few examples where virtually all taxing powers are within the control of the state. The TAR has the limited authority to grant tax exemptions and reductions in special situations.
NATURAL RESOURCES
Control over natural resources is an important factor in controlling one's economy and environmental integrity. Natural resources are the main source of actual or potential wealth for many peoples. By the same token, states desire full access to these resources and it is often difficult to persuade states that it is in their best interest to allow an autonomous government control over natural resources. However, the economic viability of the autonomous people is generally in the state's best interest. State concerns over potentially unsound management of natural resources can be addressed through joint regulation of natural resources linked to international standards and best practices.
Many of the highly autonomous peoples examined have control over substantial natural resources. The Aland Islanders, for example, control ownership over their land and the resources it contains and their government controls all natural resources. Such arrangements are also found in the Federated States of Micronesia and Puerto Rico. Scotland has control over its natural resources, except for oil and gas. Greenlanders have substantial control over their natural resources. However, the study, prospecting and exploitation of natural resources is jointly regulated by Denmark and the Greenland government. The people of the TAR have no control over their natural resources. This has deprived them of potential wealth and has led to environmental mismanagement.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Sound environmental policies are essential for a sustainable economy and for all beings within a territory. Further, environmental policies are of great importance to the larger state because environmental devastation often knows no boundaries. For these reasons both the people and the state usually have a stake in environmental policy.
South Tyrol, Greenland, Zanzibar, Andorra and Scotland enjoy complete control over their environmental policies. Similarly, in Hong Kong jurisdiction over environmental policy is vested in the autonomous government. In the TAR, on the other hand, the central PRC government controls environmental policy. Some autonomous arrangements, such as the Interim Agreement for Palestine, provide for adherence to international environmental standards and joint environmental impact assessments. Joint control is therefore not necessarily counterproductive, so long as it is tied to specific international standards.
TRANSPORTATION
Roads and other aspects of transportation can be of strategic and military importance and of vital importance to the economy. State participation in transportation may be beneficial to an autonomous government which lacks necessary financial and technological resources. However, issues of ultimate control over transportation must be considered very carefully since transportation and population influx often go hand in hand.
Only South Tyrol, Liechtenstein, the Aland and Faroe Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, Micronesia, Andorra and the Cook Islands have exclusive power over transportation. Transportation is controlled exclusively by the state in Gibraltar, Kashmir, Torres Strait Islands, the Navajo Nation, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Examples of shared control are found, for example, in the Basque Country and Catalonian where the autonomous governments have control over railways and highways which run completely within their territories.
POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
Most states seek control over postal and telecommunications systems as they may have strategic and military significance. While most autonomous governments chose not to control these systems which are expensive to run, some exceptions exist. Hong Kong, the Cook Islands and the Netherlands Antilles, for example control their own postal and telecommunications systems. San Marino and Italy share a postal union but San Marino issues its own stamps which are collectors' items due to their small circulation and thus a major source of income.
LAW AND ORDER
Control over policing is essential, especially when the relationship between the people and the state has historically been hostile. In most autonomous arrangements, the people alone or jointly with the state control policing and law enforcement. For example, the Aland Islands have sole jurisdiction over their police forces and public order. So do Micronesia, Liechtenstein, Scotland, Puerto Rico, the Netherlands Antilles, Andorra and the Cook Islands.
The Faroe Islands have joint jurisdiction with the Danish government over law and order. The Faroe Islands government maintains a small police force and coast guard. The Basic Law provides Hong Kong with exclusive jurisdiction over law and order within its territory.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
In most autonomous arrangements ultimate judicial control rests with the state. Sometimes, the people have jurisdiction over a limited area of justice administration. Only Micronesia, Andorra and Liechtenstein have an independent judiciary of their own with complete jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters.
Some autonomous governments have their own judiciary which is linked in various ways to the state. While Puerto Rico, for example, has its own court system based on Spanish law, rather than the English law on which the US judicial system is built, the US retains some control by allowing final judgments of the Puerto Rican court to be appealed to the US Supreme Court.
In Hong Kong judicial powers are vested in an "independent" judiciary based on English common law. Hong Kong's judiciary, however, is not truly independent since the decisions of its highest court are reviewable by China's National People's Congress.
In some arrangements jurisdiction is divided. For example, the Inuit, under the 1991 Nanavut Land Claim of Canada, have control over the trial and appellate courts, while the Canadian Supreme Court has final appellate jurisdiction. Similarly, Scotland has civil and criminal courts but the highest level of civil appeals lies with the British court. In the TAR, the judiciary is entirely controlled by the PRC.
In negotiations for judicial powers consideration must be given to the quality of the judicial system of the state and to the traditional judicial system of the autonomous people. In other words, the legal system's process, its neutrality and its independence from political forces may be of more importance than the issue of who controls it.
CURRENCY AND MONETARY POLICY
Most peoples use the currency of the state. However, as with postage stamps, currency may be of symbolic significance. Some peoples have a separate currency which may be used interchangeably, at the same value, with the currency of the state, which controls the monetary policy. This includes the Holy See, Scotland, Liechtenstein, Gibraltar and the peoples of the Cook and Faroe Islands and the Netherlands Antilles. Hong Kong has its own currency which is independent of the Chinese currency.
DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship can be of symbolic importance and can also be linked to other important issues such as immigration, land ownership, voting rights and access to state schools.
With few exceptions, autonomous arrangements provide that the autonomous people are citizens of the state. However, Tatars are citizens of Tatarstan and citizens of the Russian Federation. Similarly, the people of Zanzibar are citizens of both Zanzibar and Tanzania. Aland Islanders are dual citizens of Aland Islands and Finland. The people of Gibraltar, while not holding their own citizenship are British nationals and British Dependent Territory citizens. Hong Kong citizens and the people of the TAR are citizens of the PRC.
FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign policy powers can be held exclusively by the autonomous government, by the state or they can be shared. While there is often an assumption that all foreign affairs powers are matters of exclusive state concern, the study shows that foreign affairs powers can be successfully divided and shared.
The interests of the state and the autonomous governments can best be met if foreign policy powers are divided in a practical manner, so as to give the state and the autonomous government those foreign policy powers which complement the other governmental powers they each hold. Autonomous governments which enjoy a high degree of internal self-governance have a substantial interest in participating in matters of foreign policy which affect their areas of self-governance. By the same token, a state may have little interest in an area of foreign policy that is related to a governmental function within the control of the autonomous government. Thus, for example, where the state has no involvement in the economy of the autonomous people, it may have little interest in the power to enter into trade treaties affecting the autonomous territory.
San Marino, Liechtenstein, the Cook Islands, Micronesia, Andorra and Tatarstan, all are economically strong entities and enjoy the highest level of control over foreign policy within the entities studied. Liechtenstein, for example, is a sovereign state, but through an autonomous arrangement has authorised Switzerland to conduct most of its diplomatic affairs. However, it retains ultimate power over its foreign policy.
Some autonomous arrangements provide for limited participation of the autonomous government in foreign policy matters. In Hong Kong, for example, foreign affairs powers are vested in the PRC. The PRC nonetheless has authorised Hong Kong to conduct certain external affairs on its own in accordance with the Basic Law. Thus, under the name of Hong Kong China, Hong Kong may develop, maintain and conclude relations and agreements with foreign states and international organisations in the areas of trade, shipping, communications, tourism, monetary affairs and culture. Hong Kong is a distinct member of a number of international organisations, including the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation.
Palestine, though not yet independent has diplomatic relations with over 100 states and enjoys UN Observer status. However, the Interim Agreement of 1995 limits the foreign affairs powers of the PLO to the areas of economic, cultural, scientific and educational agreements with other states. Greenland and the Faroe Islands are subject to Denmark's exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs but Greenlanders and the Faroe Islanders have the right to enter into their own trade agreements.
In many other situations, however, the autonomous government does not share in foreign policy powers on a decision making level. Some people have the right under their respective autonomy arrangements to join relevant international organisations. The Inuit, for example, are a member of the Circumpolar Conference and the Aland Islanders, the Saami and the Faroe Islanders send their own separate delegations to the Nordic Council, a regional organisation of parliamentarians from the Nordic States. This type of involvement allows the people concerned to contribute their input and views to matters of foreign relations.
In the TAR and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, foreign policy powers are held exclusively by the PRC's central government, with no involvement by the autonomous governments.
DEFENCE
In virtually all the autonomous arrangements studied the power of defense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. Hong Kong and the TAR are examples of exclusive state control over defense. Some arrangements provide for demilitarisation of the territory inhabited by the people. A major provision of the 1991 Act of Autonomy of Aland, for example, provides that the Aland Islands will remain demilitarised. Similarly, Liechtenstein has been a neutral country since 1866 and is a demilitarised zone. Other autonomous arrangements provide for a reduction in military presence.
PASSPORTS/VISAS
Control over visas may have effects on economic development and tourism. Passports may be connected to issues of immigration and also may have symbolic significance for the autonomous people. Passports and visas are mostly controlled by the state. Exceptions are found in the Aland and Faroe Islands, where passports identify the people as citizens of the autonomous government and of the state. Citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia carry their own passports as Micronesian citizens. Hong Kong issues its own visas and passports, though Hong Kong citizens have become PRC citizens. The TAR, on the other hand, has no control over passports or visas.
CUSTOMS, BORDER CONTROL AND IMMIGRATION
In the great majority of situations studied, the state controls customs, borders and immigration of foreign citizens. These powers, though, can be exercised jointly or can be divided between the state and the autonomous government. Special attention must be paid to internal immigration and to residency requirements because immigration can have a profound impact on culture and can lead to cultural destruction, especially when citizens of the larger state immigrate into the autonomous territory.
The Cook Islands, the Holy See and the Federated States of Micronesia are exceptions as they have full control over customs, borders and all aspects of immigration. While Canada has power over borders and customs on Inuit land, the Inuit may exclude non-Inuits, Canadians and foreigners from entering their territory. Canadian military exercises require Inuit agreement. Further, the Inuit have exclusive jurisdiction over deciding who is Inuit. Similarly, the Navajo Nation controls entry into its territory as well as who may reside there.
In some situations these powers are divided between the state and the people. For example, in Palestine, Israel and Palestine jointly control the borders. The Hong Kong government administers and controls customs and immigration, subject to the ultimate jurisdiction of the PRC, while the PRC administers and controls these matters in the TAR.
POLITICAL RIGHTS
Adherence to human rights standards appears to be the litmus test of autonomous arrangements. In the majority of cases where the autonomous people hold substantial control over governmental powers international human rights standards are adhered to. Some newly-independent states and autonomous arrangements, including the Cook Islands, Gibraltar, Andorra and South Africa, have taken a preventive approach by expressly incorporating international human rights standards into their constitutions. Similarly some autonomous statutes, such as the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, require the autonomous government to protect and promote human rights.
On the other hand, where the basic needs of the people are not met and where the cultural identity of the people is not furthered by the autonomous arrangements, political instability and human rights violations are prevalent. The TAR, which holds virtually no ultimate control over governmental powers, unfortunately exemplifies this problem all too clearly.
In stark contrast to the degree of autonomy now held by the TAR, His Holiness's Strasbourg proposal seeks a level of autonomy for Tibet by which Tibetans would control all governmental powers except defence and certain foreign affairs powers. While similar models have been highly successful elsewhere, the real challenge for Tibet is how to reach a mutually acceptable agreement with China and how to secure its enforcement. The latter poses a special problem because China does not have an independent judiciary which can force the Communist Party to adhere to its commitments. It is thus essential that mechanisms be explored by which potential post-agreement conflicts can be effectively addressed. This could be done through special non-modifiable constitutional provisions for conflict resolution or through international undertakings or guarantees. Tibet's interests could also be safeguarded through express contractual provisions which would make the autonomous agreement voidable at the option of the Tibetans, in case of breach of the agreement. Such provisions would act as an incentive for full implementation of the agreement. On the other hand, they would clearly allow Tibetans to terminate an agreement which does not deliver the promised control and benefits. While such matters are extremely complex and difficult to negotiate they are worth full exploration. If China truly seeks political stability, it should be willing to participate in negotiations for an enforceable agreement which provides for substantial Tibetan autonomy.
Eva Herzer is a founding member and former president of the International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet.
